Regime Strategizes Over Upcoming Parliamentary Elections as Reformists Call for Boycott

http://www.insideiran.org/featured/regime-strategizes-over-upcoming-parliamentary-elections-as-reformists-call-for-boycott/#.TvD_mg7t1ls.facebook

As Iranians approach parliamentary elections in early March, it appears a crisis of participation will be more of a problem than ever. In the past, the Iranian diaspora community living abroad called for an election boycott. However, for the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic, the leaders of the reformists within the regime, including Mohammad Khatami, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha, the secretary general of the reformist Association of Combatant Clerics are emphasizing the ineffectiveness of participation in the polls.

While they refuse to use the term “election boycott,” they recognize that participating in elections is in effect useless, which is essentially a boycott. Therefore, we can predict that the regime will be faced with an electoral crisis. History has shown that widespread voter turnout is important to the regime; Iran’s leaders believe great voter participation lends legitimacy to the elections, which as neither fair nor transparent.

We have long witnessed the confrontation between the reformist and principlist (conservatives) fronts in the political structure of the Islamic Republic. This confrontation is a revisionist conflict between the people in support of the status quo and individuals arguing for reforms. The reformists were removed from politics after the fraudulent 2009 presidential election due to the solutions they presented to bringing about positive change in Iran. They proposed ideas, such as détente with America, an open economy, human rights, and the accountability of the Supreme Leader. However, these proposals were not acceptable to the principlists.

After the reformist front was completely removed from the equation, the principlists fractured into three groups: those who supported President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; traditional Principlists led by hardline Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi; and those led by Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani.

Ahmadinejad is aware of the deep hatred of the traditional principlists toward him. If his faction can win the upcoming parliamentary elections, he can be hopeful that his camp could do well in the future presidential elections in 2013. A dominant presence in the parliament would ensure that the traditional conservatives would not take revenge upon him.

The disagreement between ayatollahs Mahdavi Kani and Mesbah Yazdi is over their attempt to control the parliament and potentially the presidency through their supporters. However, more importantly, their difference lies in their attempt to secure a position for themselves as the next Supreme Leader after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. They both believe they are qualified and worthy of this position. Mahdavi Kani and Mesbah Yazdi are both senior members of the Assembly of Experts.

The principlists want to preserve the status quo. The challenge for the principlists is how to achieve this without addressing several political and economic crises facing the country. The answer has three components: force, wealth, and deception. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp is their tool for applying force. The bazaar is a tool under their control for managing wealth, and the clergy is used for deception. Fundamentally, the power structure in Iran is based on these three pillars. In the 2005 presidential election, when the principlists and reformists faced off, Ahmadinejad was victorious because he succeeded in capturing the support of these three groups.

In the fight amongst the principlist factions, Ahmadinejad has left the circle of traditional principlists due to the fact that he has lost the support of two important components; the clergy and the IRGC no longer support him. Since he is still in charge of the executive branch, he has access to petroleum revenues, but his support among the Bazaaris is also dwindling.

Therefore, among the prominent politicians vying for power, the Larijani family and their circle of supporters are the best possible option for taking over the parliament. The Larijani family and their supporters have the most connections with the three pillars of politics. As the son of an influential cleric, Ali Larijani enjoys a great relationship with the Bazaar, and he was also a senior member of the IRGC. The Larijani family is also close to Khamenei.

Ali Larijani and Sadegh Larijani are in charge of the Iranian Judicial and Legislative branches of the government, respectively. Another Larijani brother also holds influential positions in the government. Some call them the Iranian Kennedys, even though they do not possess the degree of prestige the Kennedy family has enjoyed in the United States. We should not forget that Ali Larijani was also presidential candidate in 2005, and lost the election.

Khamenei’s favorite list for the parliamentary elections, which Mahdavi Kani has been chosen to structure, possesses the aforementioned components –the clergy, IRGC, and Bazaar. Constructing such a list of candidates will not be possible unless the Guardian Council disqualifies candidates and steals the election. Therefore, what is likely to happen should be called “selections” and not elections.

It is clear that when the government chooses to ignore the crises facing the country and follows the path of tyranny, the level of participation among the people decreases. The despotic government is therefore forced to steal the elections and stage a cover-up. The 2009 presidential election was one example of this phenomenon. The upcoming parliamentary polls in March are likely to be another example of authoritarianism triumphing over free elections.

Hossein Alizadeh is the former Iranian charge d’affaires at the Iranian embassy in Finland. He resigned after the contested 2009 presidential election.